現代化理論的當頭棒喝︰Seymour Lipset 可以休矣？

The Other Middle Class; The world's burgeoning bourgeoisie may be a market for our goods—but don't expect them to buy into our values.


Rana Foroohar and Mac Margolis

15 March 2010

Newsweek

March 15, 2010; ; U.S. Edition

Volume 155, Number 11

Middle classes have always been the bulwark of society. Aristotle believed they are democracy’s secret weapon—the defenders of social values, ramparts of reason over fiat, and believers in a society run by laws instead of by strongmen. They have also been the engines of economic growth, setting the stage centuries ago for the expansion of capitalism and global trade, and continuing to snap up every new gadget or service in sight. So, it’s no wonder that as Western middle classes have become indebted and insecure, economists are pinning their hopes for global prosperity on the new emerging-market middle class, a group of go-getters who, it’s hoped, will make the world richer and more stable.



Those two goals, however, may be at odds. As an economic force, this new population is indeed growing even faster than expected. Every year, an astonishing 70 million people are joining the middle class. (In emerging markets, this is defined by Goldman Sachs as people with yearly incomes between $6,000 and $30,000.) They have become “the story of the decade,” says Goldman Sachs’s chief economist Jim O’Neill, and will surpass their Western peers in global spending power within two decades. Morgan Stanley Asia chair Stephen Roach believes that within five to 10 years, the Asian middle class alone could make up the slack left by overspent American consumers. Chinese bought more cars than Americans did last year, and India has as many Internet users as the United States. By 2030 more than nine of every 10 mobile phones will be owned by people in the developing world, with India and China leading the way.



As these developing nations became more prosperous, they were expected to look more and more like the suburbs of Washington or London—liberal, democratic, and market-friendly bastions not only of Western-style consumerism but also political liberty. With time and wealth, “they” would become just like “us.” But while the size of their wallets is becoming more American, the values of this global middle class aren’t necessarily doing the same.



Even in countries that are democratic, these new bourgeoisies looks quite different from their Western peers. In Turkey, for example, much of the middle class are devout Muslims who wear headscarves. When President Obama visits Indonesia later this month, he’ll find a more conservative country than the one he lived in as a child—in large part because of the rise of the newly rich there.



Many of the aspiring elite seem comfortable with the political status quo in their nations, willing to let the powers that be—whether authoritarian governments or elected ones—call the shots as long as the economy keeps growing. A 2009 Pew study on the global middle class found that most are supportive of democratic ideas like free speech and competitive elections, yet experts at Pew and elsewhere say this group is also willing to compromise on those ideals when they seem to threaten prosperity. In Brazil and Russia, the middle classes are more worried about being free from hunger than voting. And in China, rural people who still see little benefit from their nation’s economic growth are more likely to support democracy than the urban middle classes, who now make up three fourths of Communist Party cadres.



This political conservatism is growing rather than shrinking. More Russians today support “a strong leader” over “democracy” than did 10 years ago—no wonder, given the corruption, inequity, and plunge in average living standards that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. The members of Russia’s new middle class are among the staunchest supporters of strongman Vladimir Putin for the simple reason that they have the most to lose. “Like the rest of society, the middle class has accepted the paternalism of Putin’s government and remained apolitical and apathetic,” says Masha Lipman of the Carnegie Moscow Center. In China, the middle class was much more in favor of political liberalization before the 1989 Tiananmen massacre than it is today.



In fact, in countries like China and Brazil, which have fared well in the financial crisis, there’s a feeling that Western models are no longer something to emulate. “The Asian crisis was a turning point in that sense,” says Brookings Institution fellow Homi Kharas, who studies the new global middle class. “These countries began pursuing liberalization in their own way, at their own pace, and they’ve done well. Now they see their success as the fruit of their own efforts,” even though they’re operating within global systems of free trade and finance that were set up by the West.



Of course, no major emerging market is turning its back on free trade or financial capitalism—leaders recognize all too well the source of their prosperity. But as long as countries like China and Brazil continue to do well, more state control, rather than less, is likely to become the norm. The emerging-market giants will also be more aggressive about standing up for themselves, economically and politically. “In China, for example, the younger, richer generation has more hubris, and increasingly they are the ones in charge,” notes John Lee, a visiting fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington. “They’ll push harder to defend the country’s interests in areas like trade, resource acquisition, and foreign policy.” Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, and many other nations are similarly displaying a new political confidence, driven by their greater economic power.



Does that mean that the interests of these new middle classes will be at odds with their counterparts in the West? Perhaps, but the newcomers are just as likely to be in political and economic competition with each other. Ruchir Sharma, the emerging-markets chief at Morgan Stanley Investment Management, believes that old rivalries will be replaced by new ones—Indians, for example, are becoming less obsessed about Pakistan and more worried about the rise of China. Likewise, old friendships between countries like India and Russia will cool as those nations grow and develop in different ways, and have less common ground.



It’s also worth remembering that the new middle classes are psychologically driven by a mix of pride and insecurity. They are largely still on fragile economic footing. Many in Brazil’s new middle class owe their livelihoods to the informal market (47 percent have no job contracts), where income is irregular, safety nets are nonexistent, and opportunity for entrepreneurship is limited. Many have borrowed their way to higher living standards—one reason, perhaps, that 53 percent say they live in fear of unemployment, loss of income, or bankruptcy. They have benefited from the explosion of private schools but seen the quality of education plummet, thus eroding one of the classic middle-class paths to social mobility. “We still don’t know how sustainable the rise of the new middle classes will be,” says political scientist Amaury de Souza.



And to the extent that the new middle classes are precarious, their ability to effect political change will be, too. Some development economists predict that in these countries, the poor may end up being the greater force for social change in the short and medium term. (Consider the push for land reform among rural leaders in China.) They are the agitators who haven’t yet seen gains from the status quo. The developing world’s new consumers may have unleashed tremendous new energy at the checkout counter. But their ability to be a force for better government, greater freedom, less corruption, and more economic liberty is far less certain.

With Owen Matthews in Moscow and Kristin Minogue in Beijing